Buffalo Law Review
Volume 14

Number 2

Article 18

12-1-1964

Negligence—Complaint Alleging Mother’s Mental Distress With
Physical Manifestations Caused by Witnessing Death of Her Son
by Alleged Negligence of Defendant Held to State a Cause of
Action.
Alan A. Milinowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Alan A. Milinowski, Negligence—Complaint Alleging Mother’s Mental Distress With Physical
Manifestations Caused by Witnessing Death of Her Son by Alleged Negligence of Defendant Held to State
a Cause of Action., 14 Buff. L. Rev. 332 (1964).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol14/iss2/18

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
nate it.20 Finally, and more narrowly, it could have pointed to the novel scheme
adopted by the legislation involved. It goes beyond the common law doctrine
of respondeat superior by freeing the tort-feasor altogether while shifting liability solely to the employer. It is hard to conceive that a legislature, in enacting
legislation designed to free policemen from tort liability, also intended that the
fellow servant rule would be available as a defense against a member of the
very group whose financial welfare was to be advanced. These two grounds would
have provided the court with the opportunity to abolish this rule which both
majority and dissent decry as being antiquated, wicked, callous to human rights
and inherently and grossly unjust.
MICHAEL SWART

NEGLIGENCE
COMPLAINT ALLEGING MOTHER'S MENTAL DISTRESS WITH PHYSICAL MANI-

FESTATIONS CAUSED BY WiTNESSING DEATH OF HER SON BY ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT HELD TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

While crossing a highway, plaintiff's son was struck and instantly killed
by defendant, who was negligently driving her husband's automobile. Plaintiff,
who had been standing by the side of the road watching her son cross, sued
for personal injuries, alleging severe mental distress with physical manifestations, occasioned by witnessing his death. Defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Held, motion denied. A
pleading of negligent infliction of severe mental distress with physical manifestations, by a mother who was present and saw her son killed by defendant's
negligence, states a cause of action, even though she herself was not placed
in danger by defendant's act. Haight v. McEwen, 43 Misc. 2d 582, 251
N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
Tort liability for the infliction of mental distress has passed through
xelatively well-defined stages of development.' It was first treated as an
element of "parasitic" damages-that is, invasion of the plaintiff's "interest
in mental tranquillity ' 2 could be considered in the determination of damages,
but not in the determination of liability.8 Subsequently a duty was imposed
on those engaged in a "common calling" to refrain from unreasonably invading the right. Thus liability for the infliction of mental distress was ex20

See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 463 (1961).

1.

For an extensive treatment of this development see Amdursky, The Interest in

Mental Tranquility, 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 339 (1964), in which the intentional invasion
of this interest is treated as antedating the imposition of liability to those engaged in a
,common calling.
2. Ibid.

3. 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 461 (1906).
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tended to such classes as innkeepers 4 and common carriers. 5 More recently,
the intentional invasion of this "interest" has been treated as a separate tort.6
At present liability is in some cases extended to members of the general
public. 7 This development tends toward imposing liability where a plaintiff
witnesses a negligent act toward another-a third person.8 Plaintiff in such
a case becomes an onlooker. Because the gap between liability on the part
of a member of the general public to a plaintiff directly involved, and the
imposition of liability toward a plaintiff who is an onlooker is large, the courts
have held the defendant, even in cases of intentional torts, only where there
is extremely violent attack.9
The courts limit negligent onlooker claims primarily in terms of two
concepts-the "impact"' 0 test, in which recovery is denied absent contemporaneous physical contact with the person of the plaintiff, and the "zone of
physical peril"" test, in which recovery is denied a plaintiff who is not himself
placed in danger of immediate physical harm by the defendant's act.12 To circumvent the overly mechanical impact rule, the courts have sometimes strained to
find the necessary physical contact.' 3 The decided weight of present authority
denies recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress, regardless of accompanying physical manifestations, by a plaintiff outside the zone of peril.' 4
4. See, e.g., DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908); see generally 29 Am.
Jur. Innkeepers §§ 56, 57 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904).
6. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1956); Restatement (Second),
Torts § 46(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff,
38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Hallo v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759
(2d Dep't 1961); Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct.
1960); see 52 Am. Jur. Torts § 49 (1944), and cases collected in Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
100, 119 (1959).
7. Amdursky, supra note 1, at 341.
8. Id. at 347; see Prosser, Torts, § 37, at 182 (2d ed. 1955).
9. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 8, at 47.
10. Id. at 181.
11. Amdursky, supra note 1, at 347.
12. Regardless of the test used, the status of the bystander is all-important; those
unrelated to the victim have always been denied recovery. Hay or Bourhill v. Young,
(1943] A.C. 92; Van Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 205 Okla. 135, 235
P.2d 948 (1951); cf. Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71 Ga. App. 843, 32 S.E.2d
420 (1944).; Angst v. Great Northern R. Co., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955). These
cases contain language which would seem to be broad enough to deny recovery even to
a near relative.
13. Buckbee v. Third Ave. R.R., 64 App. Div. 360, 72 N.Y. Supp. 217 (2d Dep't
1901) (electric shock); Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286 App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 746
(3d Dep't 1955) (splinters in a blast of air). Cf. Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western R.R. Co., 73 NJ.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the eye); Morton v. Stack,
122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke); "A Georgia circus case
has reduced the whole matter to a complete absurdity by finding 'impact' where de-'
fendant's horse 'evacuated his bowels' into plantiff's lap." Cristy Bros. Circus v.
Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928); Prosser, Torts 179 (2d ed. 1955).
14. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Amaya v. Home
Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963), reversing, 23 Cal. Rptr.
131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1962); Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963);
Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956); cf. Kelly v. Fretz, 19
Cal. App. 2d 356, 65 P.2d 914 (1937); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80
(1957); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Robbins v. Castillani,
37 Misc. 2d 1046, 239 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71
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Thus, in Berg v. Baumr5 the complaint of a mother alleging severe mental distress on witnessing the injury of her son because of defendant's negligence, was
dismissed, as she was outside the zone of peril. In denying recovery under the
zone of peril test, the reason usually given is that the defendant has no duty
toward the plaintiff, since no harm to him is foreseeable. 10 Tentative Draft No. 5
of the Restatement (Second) Torts (1960) has, in deference to the overwhelming
weight of the case law,17 dropped the Caveat appearing in section 313 of the
Restatement, Torts (1934).18
Physical impact is no longer required in New York State to sustain a
claim of mental distress. Battalla v. State19 although overruling Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 20 did not deal with an onlooker claim, as plaintiff was within
A.2d 792 (1950); All v. John Gerber Co., 36 Tenn. App. 134, 252 S.W.2d 138 (1952);
Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Lahann v. Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E.
917 (1900); Nuckles v. Tenn. Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927);
cf. Sanderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902).
Contra, Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Cohn v. Ansonia
Realty, 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914), 162 App. Div. 794, 148
N.Y. Supp. 41 (1st Dep't 1914); Gulf, C. & S.F.R.R. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (1906).
15. 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
16. Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 181.
17. Note 14, supra.
18. The Caveat read: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether an actor
whose conduct is negligent as involving an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm
to a child or spouse is liable for an illness or other bodily harm caused to the parent
or spouse who witnesses the peril or harm of the child or spouse and thereby suffers
anxiety or shock which is the legal cause of the parent's or spouse's illness or other bodily
harm." In the notes and comments appearing in the Tentative Draft, the Reporter, Dean
Prosser, mentions that the Advisors are unanimous in wishing to retain the Caveat for
its possible effect upon the courts, ". . . although it must be conceded that it has
thus far had no effect. . . . The Council are agreed that the Caveat should go out, and
the definite rule of non-liability should be stated." Restatement (Second), Torts, Note to
Institute, § 313 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1960). The Tentative Draft states the rule of
§ 313 as follows:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he
is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of
causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril
of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it
were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
While this section is substantially unchanged, a second subsection has been added:
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no application to illness or
bodily harm of another, caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm
or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created
an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.
The comment on subsection (2) states that subsection (1) applies only to emotional
distress arising out of fear for plaintiff's own safety; it is not applicable where the
emotional distress arises solely because of harm or peril to a third person, and plaintiff
is not threatened with bodily harm in any way. The comment continues:
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a child in the street,
and its mother, in the immediate vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers severe
emotional distress, resulting in a heart attack or other bodily harm to her, she
cannot recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the path of the
vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with bodily harm, otherwise
than through the emotional distress at the peril to her child.
19. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
20. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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the zone of peril. Prior to Battalla, New York had denied recovery to parents
for mental suffering caused by a child's illness or injury.2' Kalina v. General
Hospital22 limits the application of Battalla; the court dismissed the parents'
complaint, stating that they did not have a legally protected interest under
the circumstances:
The basic principle of these cited cases 23 is untouched by the
recent reversal of the Mitchell doctrine. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co. (151 N.Y. 107 [1896]) established the rule that there can be
no recovery for injuries incurred by fright, negligently induced.
.Battalla v. State of New York (10 N.Y.2d 237 [1961]) expressly
overruled it. We deem it the intention of the Battalla case to realistically enlarge the damage claim of one acted against. It did not
intend to24provide a cause of action for interested bystanders hitherto
excluded.

The latest New York case2 5 involved a fact situation almost identical with
the instant case; the complaint was dismissed. Other jurisdictions have reached
26

the same conclusion.

In the instant case the court based its opinion on a general trend rather
than precedent, and was primarily concerned with plaintiff's right to bring
an action, based on the fact that "Freedom from mental disturbance is now
a protected interest in this State."2 7 The Battalla decision is heavily relied
upon. Defendant's argument that in that case, the plaintiff was the person
placed in immediate danger, is treated as being inapplicable to the question
of whether or not to dismiss the complaint. The court reasons that the only
satisfactory method of answering this question is to analyze thoroughly the
evidence adduced at trial. The above quoted passage from Kalina is dismissed
as obiter dictum.
In support of its argument based on trend, the court relied on several
cases which merit close examination. One had been reversed on appeal. 28 A
21. Roher v. New York, 279 App. Div. 1116, 112 N.Y.S.2d 603 (3d Dep't 1952);
Blessington v. Autry, 105 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Balestrero v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 126 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 794, 128 N.Y.S.2d 295
(2d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 709, 121 N.E.2d 537 (1954). In Fiorello v. New York
Protestant Episcopal City Mission Society, 217 App. Div. 510, 514, 217 N.Y. Supp. 401,
406 (1st Dep't 1926) the court said:
The parent's rights in an action. for injuries to the child are restricted to an
action for the loss of the child's services and for medical attendance and expenses. Mental suffering caused by the child's illness is not recoverable.
§
22. 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 757, 235
N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 599

(1963).

23. The court had previously cited, inter alia, the cases in note 21 supra, in support
of its statement that damages are recoverable only by the person assaulted.
24. 31 Misc. 2d 18, 20, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
25. Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
26. -See supra note 14.
27. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996,
999 (1958). In light of the Berg and Kalina cases, this statement is severely limited, and
insofar as it represents the result in only a few cases, it is conclusory.
28. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963),
reversing 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1962).
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second 29 seemingly allowed recovery only because the mother, although she
felt no danger for herself and could easily have ducked into an alley, was
nevertheless within the zone of risk. The case has been treated as allowing
recovery on that ground.30 A third 3 ' involved property damage and a statutory
violation by a common carrier.
The instant case must be evaluated in the light of three important decisions. 3 2 It is distinguishable from Battalla where the plaintiff was within the
zone of peril. It is distinguishable from Kalina in that plaintiff there alleged
no physical manifestations; further, the tort relied on was assault and battery-an intentional wrong. 33 It is substantially the same as the Berg case.
It is in dealing with the Kalina case that the greatest barrier to the
court's holding is encountered. In that case, the complaint was dismissed
4
for lack of defendant's duty to plaintiff. This is conclusory ;3 the relevant
question is: Why was there no duty? The Kalina court answered this question
by saying the plaintiffs had no legally protected interest-because they were,
85
in effect, onlookers. Thus, it would seem difficult to argue the quoted passage
is obiter dictum. This seems to be the reasoning in the Berg case, to which
the court did not allude.
Although it is true that "Freedom from mental distress is now a protected interest in this State," 36 and that every case must be decided according
to the facts peculiar to it; 3 7 still, "[1]iability for damages caused by wrong
38
ceases at a point dictated by public policy and common sense." ". . . [o] nce
29. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [19251 1 K.B. 141. Considerable doubt has been
cast upon this case by King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429.
30. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 8, at 181.
31. Gonsenhauser v. New York Cent. R.R., 8 A.D.2d 483, 188 N.Y.S.2d 901 (4th
Dep't 1959).
32. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961);
Kalina v. General Hospital, 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961), afl'd, 18
A.D.2d 757, 235 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962), afl'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309,
245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963); Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
33. Additionally, it is distinguishable from both Kalina and Battalla in that in
those cases, defendant was engaged in a common calling, whereas in the instant case,
defendant was a member of the general public. While this is generally of greater importance
in questions of duty or standard of care, it is arguable that if recovery is not to be extended
to a plaintiff where defendant, as in Kalina, is engaged in a common calling, a jortiori
recovery should not be allowed where defendant is merely a member of the general
public.
34. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 8, at 167; Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273
Wisc. 176, 182, 77 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1956), quoting Prosser, Palsgraj Revisited, 52 Mich.
L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1953), reprinted in Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law oj Torts 191
(1954); see generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 Colum. L. Rev.
1014 (1928).
35. "We deem it the intention of the Battalla case to realistically enlarge the damage
claim of one acted against. It did not intend to provide a cause of action for interested
bystanders hitherto excluded." Kailna v. General Hospital, 31 Misc. 2d 18, 20, 220 N.Y.S.2d
733, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1961). It is because the parents have no legally protected interest as
onlookers that Halpern, J., dissenting, argues that the parents are the parties%directly
wronged. He notes that "The impact of the Battalla decision upon that type of case
is still to be determined." 18 A.D.2d 157, 760, 235 N.Y.S.2d 808, 814 (4th Dep't 1962).
36. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996,
999 (1958).
37. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918);
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961).
38. Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 269, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934).
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the door has been opened, the new and broader rule is in practice pressed to
its extreme conclusion." 39 It is for this reason a Pennsylvania court recently
' 40
refused to "open a Pandora's box."

The idiosyncratic plaintiff poses special problems. 41 Ordinarily, a negligent defendant must take his victim as he finds him,4 the usual argument
being that as between an innocent victim and a negligent wrongdoer, the loss
should fall on the latter. This reasoning is based on the foreseeability of damage, however, and is not readily extended to onlooker liability, where plaintiff's presence may not be foreseen at all. In such a situation, where the
plaintiff is not directly wronged and defendant will be liable to the person
injured, it would seem unjust to visit disproportionate double liability upon
him. Although liability might be limited to parents or spouses, other situations immediately present themselves. If a child had been raised by an aunt,
should she recover? Should recovery be allowed a sister, a mistress? Viewed
in this context, Judge Van Voorhis' dissent in Battalla4O becomes highly
relevant.

For the present, the vast majority of jurisdictions44 limits the expanding
circle of recovery short of onlooker claims with respect to negligence situations.
In New York, this has been accomplished by the Kalina case, with which
the instant case is irreconcilable. The Court of Appeals deems it more just
to limit defendant's liability to reasonably foreseeable consequences, 45 defined
by the zone of peril, than to extend recovery to what would become, in time,
an inevitable plaintiff; every child has some relative. It is submitted this is
desirable social policy, and that the instant case should not be followed. 46
ALAN A. MILINOWSKI
39. Van Voorhis, J., dissenting in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 244, 176 N.E.2d
729, 733, 219"N.Y.S.2d 34, 39 (1961).
40. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 168, 142 A.2d 263, 266 (1958). In retaining the
impact rule, the court expressed fear of the possibility of fraudulent claims and the difficulty of proof.
41. Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943);
McNiece, Psychic Injury and Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1949).
42. McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911); Owen
v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., 304 N.Y. 457, 108 N.E.2d 606 (1952); 15 Am. Jur. Damages
§§ 80, 81 (1938).
43. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 732, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38
(1961).
44. Cases cited note 14 supra.
45. "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone. Though where a material damage
occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether
overlook the feelings of the party interested." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598; 11 Eng.
Rep. 854, 863 (1861). (Emphasis added.)
46. In four cases in which Battalla was cited to the court, it was distinguished on
the grounds that Battalla did not extend recovery to bystanders witnessing an accident.
These were Lahann v. Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Berg v. Baum, 224
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kalina v. General Hospital, 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d
733 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 757, 235 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 13
N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963); Argyll v. International Security
Bureau, 16 A.D.2d 921, 229 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1st Dep't 1962). The instant case was subsequently settled out of court.

